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IN DEFENSE OF APPEARANCES: A REPLY TO MARCIA
BARON'S THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HOW THINGS SEEM
SARAH Buss*

I agree with most of what Marcia Baron says in The Moral Significance of How Things Seem.1 I agree that we should care about what we
express when we do something-or, at any rate, about what our actions
express.2 And I agree that under most circumstances, we should not
alter our behavior in order to prevent others from mistakenly believing that we are doing something else.' Like Baron, I think that we
should beware of exaggerating both our power to motivate others with
our example and our obligation to do so.4 And I, too, think that we
ought not to permit the opinions of others to exercise much power
over our own decisions.
Nonetheless, I am hesitant to endorse Baron's central claim. I
am uneasy about her suggestion that, though we are morally required
to care about what our actions express, the moral imperative to care
about what they appearto express is (except in special cases) much
weaker and more limited in scope.5 In this Commentary I will argue
that in most human interactions, what we appear to be doing is more
important than Baron acknowledges. In defending this thesis, I will
call attention to the wide range of cases in which what we express in
our actions depends upon, and is even indistinguishable from, what
we appear to express.
I will focus on the moral appearance of our actions. After briefly
noting the familiar epistemic grounds for being sensitive to this appearance, I will consider cases in which our actions give offense. I will
argue that it matters whether we offend people (even when the offense taken is unwarranted), and that this gives us a reason to care
* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Iowa. B.A., Ph.D., Yale University.
1. Marcia Baron, The Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REv. 607 (2001).
2. See id. at 639-40 (contrasting the significance of how actions appear with the importance of what they express).
3. See id. at 624-26.
4. See id. at 629 ("Very few other people are likely to be swayed, by my supposed election to engage in a certain activity, into thinking that what they had hitherto thought was
wrong must actually be all right after all."); id. at 628-29 (asserting that "generally, it is not
really my business to worry that others, seeing me do x, will mistakenly believe that I am
doing y, which they correctly hold to be wrong, and will then decide that if I am doing y, it
must be okay for them to do it").
5. See id. at 63940.
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about how we appear to be treating the people with whom we interact.
We have reason to try to avoid appearing disrespectful and unfeeling;
and if we fail in this regard, we have reason to respond to the offended party with apparent concern and respect.
Baron cites with approval Laurence Thomas's observation that
[m] oral deference is meant to reflect the insight that it is wrong to
discount the feelings and experiences of persons in diminished social
category groups simply because their articulation of matters does not
resonate with one's imaginative-take on their experiences.',6 As far as
I can tell, what holds for members of oppressed groups holds for everyone else: in order to treat others with respect (and with beneficence
too), we must be receptive to their take on things-and receptive, in
particular, to their take on our actions. More particularly still, we
must not be indifferent to whether our actions appear to be unkind or
disrespectful, or in other ways morally indefensible. Baron claims that
we need not go out of our way to demonstrate this receptivity when we
(or others in our group) have done nothing to call it into question.7 I
agree. But the question is raised not only, as she suggests, when a
person is a member of an oppressed group and we belong to the oppressing group, or when we have ourselves mistreated the person in
the past.8 Whether we have sufficient concern and respect for another human being becomes a question-at least for this human being-as soon as we interact with her in a way that she deems to be
disrespectful or unfeeling.
Suppose I do something that others take to be wrong: I order a
steak; I spend money on a cappuccino for myself; I speak quickly and
loudly in challenging someone who is insecure and shy. These acts
are not what Baron calls "expressive acts." Their value does not lie in
what I am "attempting to express" by performing them.9 Yet in the
eyes of my critics, they express, respectively, a lack of respect for the
moral value of animals, a lack of concern for the suffering of other
members of my own species whose lives might be saved by that two
dollars and change, a lack of respect and concern for my interlocutor.
We may suppose that I do not see things this way myself. But if I am to

6. Id. at 618 (quoting Laurence M. Thomas, Moral Deference, in THEORIZING MULTICULA GUIDE TO THE CuRRENT DEBATE 359, 375 (Cynthia Willett ed., 1998)).
7. See id. at 619.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 609 (discussing beneficent and expressive acts and defining the latter as
.acts whose value lies entirely in what is expressed, or in the fact that one is attempting to
express" a certain principle or emotion).
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avoid being a moral clod (or worse), I had better take these appearances seriously.
One reason for this is obvious: my critics may be right. What
appears to me to be perfectly permissible behavior may not really be
so. I am fallible in moral matters, just as I am fallible in other matters.
My point of view is just one among many; and it may not be the best
point of view from which to survey the moral terrain. John Stuart Mill
is justly famous for making this very point. Moral progress, he warns,
is not possible if we insulate our beliefs about what is right from the
beliefs of others.1" And even when we can discover no compelling
reason to change our opinion on some matter, an openness to other
ways of looking at our behavior is essential to our ability to understand
both what we believe and why we are justified in believing it.1 1
Our epistemic limitations are not the only reason why we ought
to care about the viewpoints of others-and about the appearances
accessible from these other viewpoints. How our behavior appears to
others matters for the simple reason that they matter. And they matter
not just as the means to our ends, but as ends in themselves. Even
when I have thoroughly and carefully reviewed the reasons forjudging
my behavior to be morally wrong, and even when, as a result, I have
confidence in my own assessment, the respect I owe to others requires
that I be sensitive to their points of view when I interact with them;
and this requires that I beware of appearing not to care about how
they perceive my actions. In particular, I ought to be sensitive to
whether my behavior appearsto be offensive. And when it does appear
offensive to those with whom I am interacting, I ought to appear to
care about this.
It is important to note that the requirement to be sensitive to
someone's "take" on one's behavior is partly grounded in the duty of
benevolence: if I really am indifferent to the fact that my behavior
appears to be disrespectful or hardhearted, then I really am unfeeling,
because I really am indifferent to whether I have "hurt someone's feelings"; and if my indifference is apparent to those I have offended,
then this is an additional source of distress. Having acknowledged
this point, however, I want to turn my attention elsewhere. I want to
focus on the extent to which, and the reason for which, indifference
to appearances is disrespectful as well as unkind. In a nutshell, such
indifference is disrespectful because, at least in most circumstances, it
10. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76 (Penguin Books, 1979) (1859) (noting that "the
peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race,
posterity as well as the existing generation").
11. See id. at 97-99.
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is incompatible with appearing to take other points of view seriously,
and because appearing to dismiss the value of other points of view is
one way of appearing to dismiss the human beings who occupy these
points of view.
Just as I would be disrespectful if I put on my headphones in the
middle of a boring philosophy lecture, so, too, I would be disrespectful if I made no attempt to listen to my neighbor's impassioned defense of animal rights or the right to grow hemp. Even if I have
already heard the same views ably defended by the guy down the
street, I ought not to give my neighbor the impression that I couldn't
care less, that I believe she is wasting my time. I ought to appear to
listen to what she has to say, not because I stand to learn anything
from her, but simply because she is addressing me civilly, as one surveyor of the moral scene to another.
The other day, as I walked down the alley near my house, I had a
brief encounter with another alley-dweller who is a stranger to me.
We said "Good morning" to each other. And then he said, as I was
passing him by, "It's a lot colder today." I already knew that, of
course. And he knew that I knew. In order to take his point of view
on the weather seriously, there was absolutely nothing I needed to do.
After all, it was my point of view too. But had I done nothing, I would
have been disrespectful. In order to avoid treating him as if he were
of no greater value than the weather itself, I had to appearto take his
point of view seriously. This does not mean that I had to appear to
ponder it deeply, or to weigh the pros and the cons. Rather, I simply
had to acknowledge that, in some admittedly very small way, his viewpoint mattered. Even as I moved on by, I had to affirm his take on the
weather ("Yep, it sure is!"), or to respectfully offer the contrary view
that the previous morning had not been any warmer.
As I hope this last example makes clear, my point is not that we
have to stop and listen to every crank who threatens to disrupt our
plans for the day. My point is that the moral importance of being
receptive to other people's "take on things" is grounded not only in
our fallibility and their capacity to enlighten us-not only, that is, on
their value as means to the end of our avoiding moral error. It is also
grounded in their value as ends in themselves. In the typical case, we
cannot express respect for this value-indeed, we express disrespect,
even contempt-unless we appear to be receptive to the points of view
of those whom our actions affect. And we cannot appear to be receptive if we appear to be indifferent to whether our actions appear offensive or heartless.
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If human beings had no value, then it would not matter in the
least whether they were ever upset or in pain. But human beings are
intrinsically valuable. And so when someone with whom I am interacting takes offense at something I do, this matters-even if I believe that
taking offense is unwarranted. Since this matters, it should matter to
me. If it does not matter to me-if I am indifferent to whether my
action appears to be disrespectful or hardhearted-then the offense is
compounded: my response to the offended person's feelings and
judgment expresses the view that, as Baron puts it, this person just
doesn't "count."12 Since this is a disrespectful message, as well as a
hurtful one, it is important for me not to be indifferent. If I really am
indifferent to whether I appear to be expressing respect and concern,
then I really am disrespectful; I imply that the moral judgment at the
heart of the distress I have caused is not worth my notice. In short,
one way to really offend someone is to show no concern about whether
one appears to have offended her. And since this means that one gives
offense if one appears to be indifferent to whether one appears to give
offense, a commitment to treating people with concern and respect is
a commitment to making an effort not to appear disrespectful.
As Baron notes, "against a backdrop of disrespect... not addressing the disrespect ...

itself shows disrespect.""

And, as she also says,

where there is a "climate of mistrust," we must pay "special attention
to how our actions may appear." 4 If I am less inclined than Baron to
downplay the importance of how our acts appear, this is, in part, because I am more struck than she is by how easy it is to create a bad
climate. We can cause someone distress with nothing more than a
slight modulation in our tone of voice, a barely perceptible alteration
of our gaze, a curl of our lip. Because in most cases, it is also quite
easy to avoid such disrespectful expressions; we thus have a very good
reason to be sensitive to the impression we are making even before
the climate turns bad.
According to Baron, the relative unimportance of how our actions appear is illustrated by affirmative action policies. 5 Such policies, she says, ought to express respect for those they are meant to
help.1 6 But as long as they do this-as long as their "message" is (as
Thomas Hill puts it) that "we acknowledge that you [the intended
12. See Baron, supra note 1, at 617.
13. Id. at 619.
14. Id. at 640.
15. Id. at 622-23,
16. See id. at 620 ("Shaping affirmative action policies in one way rather than another,
and opting for them in the face of certain familiar objections, expresses respect.").
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beneficiary of the policy] have been wronged ....

We deplore... the

wrongs .... We welcome you respectfully into the university community and ask you to take a full share of the responsibilities as well as the
benefits"' "-those committed to implementing these policies need
not second-guess themselves just because it appears to some people
that affirmative action treats minorities as intellectual inferiors. Baron
may be right about the particular case she has in mind. I doubt, however, that we are entitled to generalize. What if, for example, the people who believed that affirmative action insults minorities were the
intended beneficiaries themselves? Surely, this would be morally significant-even if the critics were mistaken about the policy's "real"
message. More obviously still, it would be downright disrespectful to
dismiss their criticisms as irrelevant. In considering whether to implement an affirmative action policy, administrators should be as concerned about how the policy strikes the targeted minorities as they are
about what it really expresses. Indeed, given human fallibility, if the
policy appears disrespectful according to those it is meant to help, this
ought to be taken as grounds for wondering whether it really does
express respect. As Baron herself notes: "On the question of whether
something is offensive to a certain group,. . . members of that group

have insight into the matter that outsiders lack."18
The moral and political debates over affirmative action illustrate
the extent to which disagreements about what an action or policy expresses are, at the same time, disagreements about what it appears to
express. When Hill urges us to pay attention to "the messages that are
likely to be received" from an affirmative action policy,"9 he might just
as well have admonished us to notice what messages the policy is likely
to appear to be giving. Since the "real message" of an action or policy
may not be an established fact, the attempt to discern this message
just is the attempt to discern what message the action or policy appears to express. It is, presumably, for this very reason that, at the end
of her article, Baron suggests that " [i] f it is by no means clear whether
our action expresses x or not, the responsibility to attend to the expressive meaning of our action is somewhat weaker."2 ° But surely, this
generalization is false. When we are unsure of what message we are
giving, our responsibility is just as strong as-and so our moral burden
is even greater than-when we are certain about what our action con17.

The Message of Affirmative Action, in AUTONOMY
(internal quotation marks omitted).
18. Baron, supra note 1, at 618.
19. HILL, supra note 17, at 190.
20. Baron, supra note 1, at 641.
THOMAS

E.

HILL, JR.,

SPECT 189, 209 (1991)

AND SELF-RE-
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veys. The fact that we are doing something whose meaning is unclear
requires us to be attentive to what our action expresses. And this is
precisely because in such cases it is harder for us to be confident
about what our action appears to be expressing.
Baron points out that many actions or gestures have a "standard
meaning," and she suggests that when we perform these actions, or
make these gestures, they express this standard meaning. 2 ' From
what I can tell, however, expressive actions typically cannot communicate the message standardly associated with them unless the agent appears to have the attitude appropriate to the message. To take one of
Baron's own examples of expressive action, it is almost impossible to
express regret when one utters the appropriate words in a joyful tone
of voice, or while-in the presence of an intended target-one leafs
through the telephone book, or assiduously clips one's nose hairs.2 2
Not all expressive actions are like this: just by clapping, one can, I
think, express appreciation for a boring performer, even if one's face
is a blank, or if one is already pulling on one's coat. Nonetheless,
clapping is an exceptional case. And the other exceptions do not include expressions of respect and concern. Expressing respect and
concern is more like laughing at someone's joke than like clapping
for her performance. In order to express appreciation for someone's
joke, it won't do to simply say "Ha, ha, ha!" In order for a laugh to
have its standard meaning, one must appear to "get" the joke one is
laughing at, and to find it funny; and this appearance cannot be generated by the act of laughing alone. So, too, our words and gestures
of deference derive their standard power from the attitudes we appear
to have while we utter the words and go through the motions. Appearances matter in such cases because expressive action involves an
attempt to express something to someone, and because the attempt cannot be successful if what we do appears to express something else.
Because appearances matter where expressions of concern and
respect are at issue, it is possible to fake concern and respect. Just as a
good actor can fool someone into thinking that he finds her dumb
joke amusing, so too a good actor can fool someone into thinking that
he values her as an end in herself. In such cases, there is clearly something morally abhorrent about the agent. Yet, insofar as the issue is
whether he treats another human being with respect, what he appears
to believe is more important than the reality. More carefully, a person's genuine expression of concern and respect for another human
21. See id. at 607 n.1.
22. Cf id. at 615-16 (noting that some manners of expressing regret are better or more
convincing than others).

2001]

IN DEFENSE OF APPEARANCES

649

being need take no deeper form than a sincere attempt to act concerned. In other words, provided that one really is open to other
points of view, one need not really value a given person who occupies
one of these viewpoints in order to succeed in treating her with concern and respect. It is enough that one appears to value her; it is
enough that one appears to regard her as someone who deserves to be
taken seriously.
Of course, if one does not value human beings except as possible
sources of insight, then one is far more likely to treat individual
human beings with contempt. Appearing to value someone when one
really does not can thus be difficult to sustain. But the value of appearances that do not reflect an underlying reality extends beyond cases in
which someone does not really regard other human beings as ends in
themselves. It is, more fundamentally, a function of the fact that we
cannot acknowledge a person's value as a person without acknowledging the value of her point of view-that to treat someone with whom
we are interacting as if we attribute no value to her point of view is to
treat her with disrespect. One way we acknowledge the value of a person's point of view is to act according to only those principles that she
could reasonably endorse. But when we are actually interacting with
this person, something more is required of us: we must appear to take
her actual point of view seriously. And this requires that we appear to
"consider" her point of view, even though we have already given it all
the consideration we think it is due. Again, in order to "show respect"
for my alley neighbor when he sends a thought my way, I must "show
respect" for this thought, even though I have heard it all before, and
even though this thought is of no value to me. In most such cases,
appearing to consider a person's attitudes and beliefs is not misleading: my neighbor knows that what I really think of his opinion-and
even whether I really think his opinion is worth thinking about-is
beside the point. In such cases, what I appearto think is what really
counts because, in such cases, appearing to give consideration to
"where someone is coming from" is the way of really showing consideration for him.
Baron notes that, "[i] n the context of a close relationship," the
person with whom one is interacting can often legitimately wish to
"hear" that one "feels the pain," or some other appropriate emotion,
when one announces a decision that is likely to hurt this person.2 3 In
defending the moral significance of what we appear to feel or think in
our interactions, I am simply suggesting that close relationships are
23. Id. at 616.
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not unique in this respect. And I am offering yet another reason for
thinking that Baron obscures the complex relationship between expressing x and appearing to express x when she says: "Appearances
often contrast with reality, but an action cannot express x unless x is
24
really there."
Appearances often do not contrast with reality. We want to know
whether someone appears to favor our proposal because we want to
know whether she really does support it. We ask, "Did she look sad?"
and "Does she seem to be willing to bargain?" because we believe that
the appearances in these and many other cases are the appearances of
what is really there. At the same time, we recognize that, as Baron
herself concedes, an act can express x even though x is "not something that the actor feels or thinks. 2' 5 And this, I have argued, is not
simply because some actions have a "standard meaning," but because
what some actions express depends on no more and no less than what
the actor appears to feel or think. The "warmth" someone appears to
feel when her act really does express warmth-or (to take another of
Baron's examples) the "superiority" she appears to feel when she really does "act superior" 2 6 -need not be "really there"; in order for
someone to express warmth, superiority, and any number of other
feelings, thoughts, and attitudes, it is not only necessary, but sufficient, that she appear to have them. This is what makes insincere expressions of warmth possible. But my point about the imperatives of
respect is that some expressions of what is not "really there" are perfectly sincere: the mere appearance of taking another human being's
point of view seriously can be a way of sincerely expressing one's commitment to taking him seriously as a human being.
Baron notes that "there is no end to the possible mistaken beliefs
to which my actions might give rise, "27 and she warns that if we pay
"more than a very small amount of attention to appearances," we risk
"screwing up our values." 28 I agree. But as I have indicated, I do not

think that the requirement to attend to whether our actions appear
disrespectful or unfeeling imposes on us the heavy burden of deliberately reviewing the countless ways that people might possibly interpret
these actions. To the contrary, with a little training, most of us become as sensitive to the impression we are making as we naturally are
to the temperature in the air-and just as unobsessed about it. Of
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

607.
640.
614 & n.14.
623.
634.
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course, most of us care more about what people think of us than we
care about the air temperature. So the very sensitivity that prevents us
from being moral clods also threatens to make us moral cowards, who
refrain from doing anything that we fear may rock the boat or in
other ways cause displeasure. The proper response to this threat is
not, however, to cultivate indifference to appearances, but rather, to
free our self-esteem from reliance on the opinions of others. This is a
central message in the work of one of the most eloquent critics of the
human tendency to become slaves to the opinions of others: JeanJacques Rousseau admonishes us to be sensitive to the feelings and
judgments of others, even as he rails against human vanity and tells us
how to raise our children so that they will not succumb to it; he insists,
moreover, that maintaining this sensitivity is no difficult task, as long
as we really do value other human beings properly.2" "True politeness
consists in showing benevolence to men. It reveals itself without difficulty when one possesses it. It is only for the man who does not possess true politeness that one is forced to make an art of its outward
forms."3
As Rousseau's remark suggests, since it is not especially difficult
to discern whether our actions appear disrespectful, unfeeling, or just
plain wrong, it is rarely difficult for us to avoid appearing disrespectful
or unfeeling, or generally indifferent to whether we do the right
thing. Indeed, the ease with which we can avoid appearing disrespectful and unfeeling is the flip side of the ease with which we can give an
offensive impression. According to Baron, we express respect by expressing a "willingness to acknowledge wrongdoing," by "welcoming
input," "not silencing dissent or criticism," "not expecting the others
...to take a 'backseat' role in the discussion of policies or the nature
of the wrong at issue."'" I have argued that one cannot express "willingness," or the "expectation" that others will share the front seat-one
cannot really be "welcoming"-without appearingto be willing or welcoming. Regardless of whether I am right about this, however, it is no
more difficult to appearwilling or welcoming than it is to do what we
must in order to treat one another with respect. In many cases, all it
takes is a certain facial expression or tone of voice. In others, a few
words do the trick. In still others, we need merely devote a few minutes to listening (attentively) to what someone has to say. Even when
forced to contend with a fool, we can usually, with little effort, make
29. See generallyJEAN-JACQUEs RoussEAu,
1979).
30. Id. at 338.
31. Baron, supra note 1, at 619.

THE EMILE

(Alan Bloom, trans., Basic Books
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clear that we are unimpressed with his manner or opinions without
thereby appearing to be sneering at (or even "suffering") him.
Of course, the people we encounter have a range of sensibilities:
some human beings are more thick-skinned than others; some are a
bit quirky in the meanings they assign to various tones and gestures.
In acquiring a feel for how our behavior appears to others, we learn
that the same "body language" does not have the same appearance to
everyone. And part of getting to know the people in our world is
learning to adjust our behavior in subtle ways to their different sensibilities-usually without being the least bit aware of what we are doing. Even if a neighbor or colleague is inclined to perceive a sign of
disrespect where most others would notice nothing at all, we can usually avoid offending her by making only very minor adjustments. To
be sure, there are limits. When accommodating someone becomes
difficult, we need not feel morally responsible for the distress we cause
her. We are certainly under no obligation to cease doing whatever we
believe we have good reason to do. But the existence of a few perverse human beings does not provide us with a justification for ignoring how our acts appear to the others. The fact that there will always
be people whom we cannot be expected to refrain from upsetting is
no more a reason to be indifferent to whether our acts appear disrespectful than the fact that the weather can change "without warning"
is a reason to be indifferent to whether a thunderstorm appears to be
headed our way.

